Links Between Race/Ethnicity and Cultural Values as Mediated by Racial/Ethnic Identity and Moderated by Gender

Stanley O. Gaines, Jr.
Pomona College and Claremont Colleges

Claremont Graduate School

Lisa Barajas, Diana Hicks, Michael Lyde, Yumi Takahashi, and Nancy Yum
Pomona College

Diana I. Rios
University of New Mexico

Ben F. Garcia
University of California at Santa Cruz

Karlyn R. Farris and Mary S. Page
Claremont Graduate School

Two studies examined whether individualism (orientation toward one's own welfare), collectivism (orientation toward the welfare of one's larger community), and familism (orientation toward the welfare of one's immediate and extended family) are distinct cultural values predicted by race/ethnicity. The 3 constructs proved to be separate dimensions, although collectivism and familism were positively correlated. In Study 1, persons of color scored higher on collectivism and familism than did Anglos. No differences emerged for individualism. Also, persons of color scored higher than Anglos on racial/ethnic identity, which in turn was a positive predictor of all 3 cultural values. In Study 2, we replicated the group differences on collectivism and familism for men but not for women.

In a 1994 issue of Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, several authors (e.g., Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994; Gurin, Hurtado, & Peng, 1994; Kowalski & Wolfe, 1994; Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Miller & Prentice, 1994; Singelis, 1994; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) noted that personality-social psychologists in the United States increasingly are viewing the self-concept as consisting of more than individuals' personal identity. Specifically, individuals' social identity represents an important aspect of the self-concept that has been acknowledged to a far greater extent in European social psychology (e.g., Tajfel, 1979; cf. Brown, 1986) and in the burgeoning field of cultural psychology (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; cf. U. Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994) than in American personality-social psychology. The evolving view that individuals' self-concept is shaped largely by the norms embraced by the social group(s) to which individuals belong is not captured adequately by more traditional concepts such as the looking-glass self or environmental determinism (Crocker et al., 1994; Ewen, 1993; see also Brewer, 1991; Schellenberg, 1978). As is evident from a 1995 issue of the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology (Cross, 1995; Dhawan, Roseman, Naidu, Thapa, & Rettek, 1995; Kashima, 1995; Lalljee & Angelova, 1995; Rothbaum & Xu, 1995; Singelis & Sharkey, 1995; Yamaguchi, Kuhlman, & Sugimori, 1995), this evolving view has been proposed largely—if not primarily—by psychologists born or living outside the shores of the continental United States.

The trend toward viewing the self-concept as including social as well as personal identities is laudatory. However, certain potentially erroneous assumptions regarding individuals' personal and social identities seem to have been made, even by those personality-social psychologists who specialize in the study of culture and personality. One such assumption is that individuals (and, for that matter, entire nations) can be depicted accurately as either individualistic or collectivistic—an assumption that may reflect the bias of the United States and other Western
nations toward dichotomization of constructs (see Braithwaite & Scott, 1991). Another such assumption is that cross-cultural differences in prevailing value orientations are to be found primarily by comparing samples from the United States (usually Anglos) with samples from other nations (usually persons of color), and not by comparing ethnic groups within the United States (for exceptions, see Szapocznik, Scopetta, de los Angeles Aranalde, & Kurtines, 1978; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988).

In the present studies, we sought to determine whether psychological individualism, collectivism, and familism represent three distinct cultural value orientations. In both studies, we also sought to determine whether these cultural value orientations vary as a function of individuals' race/ethnicity across multiple samples within the United States. In Study 1, we examined the extent to which racial/ethnic identity (Helms, in press; Phinney, 1996) mediates the impact of race/ethnicity on individuals' cultural value orientations. Finally, in Study 2, we examined the extent to which the impact of race/ethnicity on individuals' cultural value orientations is moderated by gender.

Individualism, Collectivism, and Familism as Distinct Cultural Value Orientations

Research in cultural psychology is not a recent phenomenon, as is evident from an early influential study of cultural value orientations by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961). However, it was not until the publication of Hofstede's book *Culture's Consequences* in 1980 that it began in earnest. Drawing in part on Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's findings, Hofstede identified "individualism–collectivism" as one of four key psychological dimensions along which nations differ reliably (the other three being power and distance, uncertainty and avoidance, and masculinity–femininity; see also Bochner, 1994). Hofstede defined *individualism* as a tendency to place one's own needs above the needs of one's in-group and *collectivism* as a tendency to place the needs of one's in-group above one's own needs. Since the advent of cultural psychology, those definitions of individualism and collectivism as mutually exclusive have gone largely unchallenged (Gudykunst & Matsumoto, 1996).

Despite the intuitive appeal of dichotomies such as individualism–collectivism, at least one other pair of personality constructs defined as dichotomous by Hofstede (1980), namely, masculinity–femininity (see also Hofstede, 1996), already had been redefined conceptually (Constantinople, 1973) and empirically (Bem, 1974; Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1974) as orthogonal dimensions in the mid-1970s. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that some authors have begun to call for a redefinition of individualism and collectivism as orthogonal constructs (e.g., Bontempo, 1993; Gaines, 1995; Gelfand, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis et al., 1993; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990) have argued persuasively for the inclusion of femininity within the larger rubric of collectivism, we contend that individuals' orientations toward family and community are qualitatively different (see also Freeberg & Stein, 1996; Gaines, 1995; Gurin et al., 1994; Marín & Marín, 1991; Oyserman, 1993).

Many cultural psychologists (most notably Triandis; for reviews, see Triandis, 1990, 1993, 1994) have observed that by age 2 or 3, children typically have begun to distinguish between themselves and others. However, the others in question consist mainly of family members (e.g., parents, siblings, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins). In contrast, by age 5 or 6 (at least in the United States), when children are sent off to school for the first time, they increasingly encounter others who are not biological kin (Allport, 1954). As children begin to expand their social worlds beyond the family, they increasingly develop the capacity to accept or reject peers and other members of the larger community (Gauvain, 1995).

This is not to say that individuals' concern for the welfare of kin and their concern for the welfare of those who are not kin are totally unrelated. For instance, in the literature on African American relationships, the term *ficive kin* is often used to denote nonkin platonic relationships whose socioemotional ties are so strong that they resemble the ties that one might expect to find primarily among biological kin (Chatters, Taylor, & Jayakody, 1994; Johnson & Barer, 1990; Scott & Black, 1989). Similarly, in the literature on Latina/Latino relationships, the term *compadrazgo* is often used to denote the special ties that develop between children's biological parents and godparents (Delgado, 1980; Kutsche, 1983; Segura & Pierce, 1993). The prevalence of sociocultural phenomena such as ficive kin and compadrazgo suggests that, at least to some degree, individuals' orientations toward community and family are likely to covary.
Race/Ethnicity as a Predictor of Levels of Individualism, Collectivism, and Familism

Schweder and Sullivan (1993) once referred to the 1990s as the “decade of ethnicity” (p. 517). Ironically, even in the 1990s, American cultural psychologists often have failed to acknowledge the existence of multiple ethnic groups (and, presumably, multiple cultures; Gaines, 1995; Phinney, 1996) in the United States. Instead, American cultural psychologists have tended to compare members of American society (which typically is depicted as synonymous with European American culture; Asante, 1994; Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992) with the societies of other nations (particularly Asian nations, but also African, Latin American, and Eastern European nations; see Triandis, 1990). Moreover, they inexplicably have tended to ignore scholarship in the growing interdisiplinary fields of African American psychology (see Burlew, Banks, McAdoo, & Azibo, 1992), Latina/Latino psychology (see Padilla, 1995), and Asian American psychology (see Min, 1995). As a result, neither cultural psychologists nor mainstream personality—social psychologists as a whole mention comparisons of ethnic groups within the United States that readily could be hypothesized on the basis of theory or research in African American, Latina/Latino, and Asian American psychology (Phinney, 1996).

In African American psychology, a primary distinction has been made between African Americans' collectivist tendencies and Anglos' individualistic tendencies (e.g., Asante, 1994; Gaines, 1994; White & Parham, 1990), with a secondary distinction made between African Americans' familialistic tendencies and Anglos' individualistic tendencies (e.g., Oyserman, Gan, & Ager, 1995). In Latina/Latino and Asian American psychology, though, a primary distinction has been made between Latinas'/Latinos' and Asian Americans' familialistic tendencies and Anglos' individualistic tendencies (e.g., O'Briend & Fugita, 1991; A. Ramirez, 1987; M. Ramirez, 1983; Rosenberger, 1992; Sabogal, Marín, Otero-Sabogal, Marín, & Perez-Stable, 1987; Xi, 1994), with a secondary distinction made between Latinas'/Latinos' and Asian Americans' collectivist tendencies and Anglos' individualistic tendencies (e.g., Sung, 1985; Valenzuela & Dornbusch, 1994). Regardless of which "we-orientation" among a given ethnic minority group is more likely to be contrasted with the "me-orientation" of individualism among Anglos, scholars in the fields of African American, Latina/Latino, and Asian American psychology frequently have asserted that persons of color tend to be higher in collectivism and familism than are Anglos, who in turn tend to be higher in individualism.

Assuming that the aforementioned ethnic group differences in cultural value orientations can be shown to exist empirically, what are the origins of these ethnic minority/majority differences? Harrison, Wilson, Pine, Chan, and Buriel (1995) suggested that despite the dissimilarities in the histories of contact between Anglos and each of the largest ethnic minority groups, the ubiquitous experience of oppression historically forced members of various ethnic minority groups to seek psychological, political, and economic strength in numbers:

Each group's story is different but includes a common element of exploitable resources: (a) the enslavement of Africans and, after emancipation, their segregation and perceived inferior status based on race; (b) military conflicts over land and territory between American Indians and European Americans, and the forced removal and transfer of Indians to reservations . . . (c) Asian Americans whose recent immigrants from Indochina sometimes suffer from the same subordination and exploitation endured by earlier immigrants from China, the Philippines, and Japan (the latter were incarcerated during World War II); [and] (d) Hispanics who were incorporated through conquest and displacement. (p. 294)

The indigenous psychology of ethnic minority culture differs from [that of] the majority culture in how intertwined the interest and well-being of the self is with the ethnic group to which one belongs. Self-contained individualism is an indigenous psychology of the majority culture. . . . In contrast, the degree of fluidity of boundaries between self- and non-self-interests among ethnic minorities is based on a more inclusive conception of the person or self, that is, persons are attached to families, households, communities, and the group. . . . Thus, when confronted in American society with racism, discrimination, occupational barriers, and negative portrayals of the ethnic group, ethnic minorities have used their ancestral worldviews as an adaptive strategy for pathways to achievement and sense of personal worth. (p. 304)

In the fields of African American, Latina/Latino, and Asian American psychology, some scholars have emphasized American societal discrimination as the primary influence on the extent to which persons of color in the United States hold particular values, whereas others have emphasized the indigenous cultures of those individuals (Staples & Mirandé, 1980). In any event, scholars in African American, Latina/Latino, and Asian American psychology seem to have reached consensus as to what patterns of ethnic minority/majority group differences one ought to expect regarding scores on measures of cultural value orientations. Empirically speaking, though, surprisingly little research has been undertaken by scholars in these fields—or, for that matter, in mainstream personality—social psychology—to determine whether such presumed differences between ethnic minority and majority groups in the United States can be captured by measures of cultural value orientations (Helms, in press; Phinney, 1996). Among those studies that have been conducted, some have yielded minority/majority group differences in the expected direction (e.g., Buriel & Rivera, 1980; Farris & Glenn, 1976; Rosenthal & Feldman, 1992), whereas others have failed to yield ethnic group differences (e.g., Cross, 1995; Freeberg & Stein, 1996; Kagan & Zahn, 1983; Oyserman et al., 1995).

Potential Mediators and Moderators of the Impact of Race/Ethnicity on Cultural Value Orientations

Aside from the issue of whether ethnic group differences in cultural value orientations per se are common in the United States, researchers might ask whether mediator or moderator effects serve to strengthen or weaken observed links between race/ethnicity and cultural value orientations. Regarding potential mediators of links between race/ethnicity and cultural values, racial/ethnic identity (i.e., the extent to which individuals define themselves in terms of the racial or ethnic groups to which they belong; Helms, in press; Phinney, 1996) has emerged as a key construct in African American psychology. In fact, a

Within ethnic psychology, scholars often disagree as to whether the term racial identity or ethnic identity is more appropriate. For example, Helms (in press) contended that racial identity and ethnic identity are two separate dimensions, whereas Phinney (1996) contended that the
goals of the present studies

In the present two studies, we tested two research hypotheses and posed two research questions concerning the psychological dimensions of individualism, collectivism, and familism. The research hypotheses, which were tested in both studies, were as follows: (a) Individualism, collectivism, and familism represent three distinct dimensions (although collectivism and familism were expected to be positively correlated), and (b) Anglos tend to score lower on individualism and higher on collectivism and familism than do Anglos. The research questions were more tentative, and each was limited to one of the two studies. In Study 1 we asked, Does racial/ethnic identity mediate the impact of race/ethnicity on cultural value orientations? In Study 2 we asked, Does gender moderate the impact of race/ethnicity on cultural value orientations?

term ethnic identity should be used instead of racial identity whenever possible. Nevertheless, both Helms and Phinney pointed out that the concept of race itself is problematic.

Method

Participants

Participants in Sample 1 were 102 individuals (29 men and 73 women) recruited from a variety of health care, education, and library service settings in the Los Angeles, California, area for a larger study on ethnicity, cultural value orientations, and responses to coworkers' dissatisfaction conducted by Michael C. Henderson (1996). The mean age of Sample 1 participants was 36.59 years (SD = 10.33 years). Among these participants, 64% were Anglo, 10% were African American, 6% were Latina/Latino, 14% were Asian American, 3% were Native American, and 2% did not report their ethnicity.

Participants in Sample 2 were 71 individuals (26 men, 44 women, and 1 individual who did not report his or her gender) recruited primarily from higher education classes at Claremont Graduate School by graduate students enrolled in a course on personality and interpersonal behavior. The mean age of the Sample 2 participants was 28.61 years (SD = 10.51 years). Among these participants, 51% were Anglo, 7% were African American, 17% were Latina/Latino, 21% were Asian American, 1% were "Mixed," and 3% were "Other." Participants in Sample 3 were 48 individuals (26 boys and 22 girls) recruited from a local high school for an initial study on cultural value orientations and social support among Latina/Latino adolescents conducted by Lisa Barajas (1994). All Sample 3 participants were 16 to 17 years of age and Latina/Latino (specifically, Chicano or Mexican American).

Participants in Sample 4 were 41 individuals (16 men and 25 women) from the Claremont colleges and the surrounding community for a larger study on cultural value orientations, ethnicity, and self-esteem conducted by Diana Hicks (1994). The mean age of the Sample 4 participants was 25.30 years (SD = 11.97 years). Among these participants, 33.3% were Anglo and 66.7% were African American (among the African Americans in the sample, approximately half had one Black and one White parent, and approximately half had two Black parents).

Participants in Sample 5 were 65 individuals (26 men and 39 women) recruited from the Claremont colleges and from the Los Angeles metropolitan area for a larger study on ethnicity and homophobia conducted by Michael Lyde (1994). The mean age of the Sample 5 participants was 23.91 years (SD = 7.86 years). Among these participants, 45.9% were Anglo, 50.0% were African American, and 6.0% were "Other.

Finally, participants in Sample 6 were 53 individuals (21 men and 32 women), approximately half of whom were enrolled in introductory psychology classes at Chaffey College and approximately half of whom were enrolled in an African American psychology course at the Claremont Colleges. The mean age of the Sample 6 participants was 24.04 years (SD = 7.63 years). Among these participants, 46% were Anglo, 34% were African American, 6% were Latina/Latino, 10% were Asian American, 2% were Native American, and 2% were "Other.

Instruments

Cultural value orientations. All of the samples completed at least one of the following 10-item scales: (a) Individualism, designed to measure individuals' orientation toward their own welfare; (b) Collectivism, designed to measure individuals' orientation toward the welfare of their larger communities; and (c) Familism, designed to measure individuals' orientation toward the welfare of their immediate and extended family. Stanley O. Gaines, Jr., devised the three scales by first identifying three points of reference—self, community, and family—and then considering the extent to which a variety of commonly expressed opinions appeared to reflect an orientation toward each point of reference (e.g., for individualism, "I am the master of my own fate").
for collectivism, "I have an obligation to 'give back' to my community"; and for familism, "I really believe in the saying, 'Blood is thicker than water' ") . Samples 2, 3, and 6 completed all three scales; Samples 1 and 4 completed the Individualism and Collectivism scales only; and Sample 5 completed the Familism scale only.

The default Likert-type scale that accompanied each item consisted of 5 responses, from disagree strongly (1) to agree strongly (5). To match the number of responses included in the scales of other measures they administered to their samples, Diana Hicks (1994) used a 4-point scale for Sample 4, removing the midpoint neither disagree nor agree response, and Michael Lyde (1994) used a 6-point scale for Sample 5, replacing neither disagree nor agree with two unlabeled middle points. Given that the cultural value orientation scales used in the present research have not been published previously, we shall defer presenting the results of the psychometric analyses of these scales until the Results and Discussion section.

**Ethnic identity.** In Sample 2 only, participants, also completed the 14-item Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM; Phinney, 1992), designed to measure ethnic identity. The MEIM consists of three interrelated dimensions: (a) Positive Ethnic Attitudes and Sense of Belonging (5 items), reflecting the affective components of individuals' views regarding their own group and other groups in the larger society; (b) Ethnic Identity Achievement (7 items), reflecting the knowledge components of ethnic awareness and self-identification; and (c) Ethnic Behaviors or Practices (2 items), reflecting individuals' culturally derived behavioral patterns that are endorsed and practiced by their own group (see also Brookins, 1996). Sample items include "I have a lot of pride in my ethnic group and its accomplishments" from Positive Ethnic Attitudes and Sense of Belonging, "I have a clear sense of my ethnic background and what it means to me" from Ethnic Identity Achievement, and "I participate in cultural practices of my own group, such as special food, music, or customs" from Ethnic Behaviors or Practices (Phinney, Chavira, & Tate, 1993).

All items on the MEIM were scored according to a 5-point, Likert-type scale from disagree strongly (1) to strongly agree (5). Scores were derived by reverse-coding negatively worded items, summing across all items, and obtaining the mean; higher scores thus reflected higher levels of the ethnic identity dimension in question. Reliability was high for Positive Ethnic Attitudes and Sense of Belonging (standardized item alpha = .86) and for Ethnic Identity Achievement (standardized item alpha = .83) but not for Ethnic Behaviors or Practices (standardized item alpha = .71). Unfortunately, because the Ethnic Behaviors or Practices scale consisted of only two items, we were unable to improve the reliability coefficient of the scale by dropping an item.

The correlation between scores on Positive Ethnic Attitudes and Sense of Belonging and scores on Ethnic Identity Achievement (.77) was lower than the reliabilities associated with either of the scales, suggesting that the two measures reflected related yet distinct dimensions. However, the correlations between scores on Ethnic Behaviors or Practices and scores on the other two dimensions (.64 with Positive Ethnic Attitudes and Sense of Belonging and .63 with Ethnic Identity Achievement) were higher than the reliability associated with Ethnic Behaviors or Practices, raising the question of whether Ethnic Behaviors or Practices should be considered distinct from the other two dimensions. Consequently, we decided to calculate a single score based on all 14 items of the MEIM; the resulting reliability (.91) was high enough to justify treating ethnic identity as unidimensional (following Phinney et al., 1993).2

**Procedure**

In all samples, after reading and signing an informed-consent form, each individual was instructed by the experimenter to answer the questions independently, that is, without conferring with other participants. After completing the cultural value orientation scales (along with a variety of other scales not relevant to the present study), participants read a debriefing sheet that explained the purposes of the study in greater detail. They were given the opportunity to complete a feedback sheet and then thanked and dismissed by the experimenter.

**Results and Discussion**

**Psychometric Properties of the Individualism, Collectivism, and Familism Scales**

Because some samples completed all three cultural value orientation scales, whereas other samples completed only one or two of the scales, and because all three scales were developed with explicit a priori hypotheses in mind regarding links between latent and observed variables (i.e., between particular underlying factors and particular items designed to measure them), we conducted a series of multiple-group confirmatory factor analyses (Byrne, 1989; Loehlin, 1992; Long, 1983a, 1983b) to assess the internal and external validities of the Individualism, Collectivism, and Familism scales (following Yamaguchi et al., 1995). We began by computing matrices of zero-order correlations among the 10 items that formed a given scale in each sample. We entered the correlation matrices for those samples into a structural equation model (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1979, 1989) that specified one common factor sufficient to account for significant interindividual variance in scores on the set of 10 items across all of the samples in question.

**Individualism.** Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the 10 items on the Individualism scale for Samples 1–4 and 6 are available upon request from the authors. The correlation matrices were entered into a five-group confirmatory factor analysis using maximum-likelihood estimation via LISREL (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1979, 1989).3 We hypothesized that (a) a single-factor model would explain the interitem correlations adequately and (b) all factor loadings would be positive. Although we allowed the magnitude of factor loadings to vary from item to item within each sample, we constrained the factor loadings for each particular item to be equal across the five samples. Similarly, although we allowed uncorrelated measurement error to vary from item to item within each sample, we allowed

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2 We also carried out confirmatory factor analyses (Byrne, 1989; Loehlin, 1992; Long, 1983a, 1983b) in which we tested the adequacy of goodness of fit of one- and three-factor models of factor structure for the MEIM. After accounting for unequal measurement error terms and correlated measurement error in both models (Bollen, 1989), we found that the discrepancy between the expected and observed correlation matrices for the one-factor model was not significant, χ² (76) = 90.73, ns. The discrepancy between the expected and observed correlation matrices for the three-factor model approached significance, χ² (73) = 89.71, p < .10. However, all three interfactor correlations resulting from the three-factor model were .90 or greater, suggesting that a single factor had been measured by the MEIM. In addition, the loss in degrees of freedom that accompanied the shift from the one-factor to the three-factor model was not offset by a significant reduction in chi-square (the difference in chi-squares = 1.02, the difference in degrees of freedom = 3, p = ns). Given that the one-factor model afforded greater parsimony without introducing significantly greater error, we concluded that it was the more appropriate model.

3 Because individualism was not a primary focus of Michael Lyde's (1994) study, the Individualism scale was not administered to Sample 5.
constrained uncorrelated measurement error to be equal among the items within each sample as well as across the five samples. Finally, in the initial model, we set all instances of correlated measurement error at zero.

The resulting chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio associated with the initial model (1.24) was within the range of values (1.00-2.00) commonly recommended as acceptable in structural equation analyses (Loehlin, 1992). However, the absolute chi-square value (317.93) was significantly greater than zero ($df = 255$, $p < .01$). Modification indices (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1989; Luijben, Boomsma, & Molenaar, 1988) indicated that in order to obtain a model whose chi-square value was nonsignificant (and hence provided an adequate fit to the data), it was necessary to allow correlated measurement errors to vary from sample to sample for the following pairs of items: Items 8 and 3, Items 6 and 3, Items 9 and 1, Items 7 and 1, and Items 3 and 2. The revised model yielded an acceptable chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio (1.04) and an absolute chi-square value (241.22) that was nonsignificant ($df = 230$, ns). Furthermore, the revised model provided a significantly better fit to the data than did the initial model (the difference in chi-squares = 76.71, the difference in degrees of freedom = 25, $p < .01$). Thus, we concluded that despite the variance in correlated measurement error across samples for several pairs of items, the latent-observed paths and uncorrelated measurement errors did not vary significantly across samples.

Factor loadings (i.e., latent-observed paths) associated with the 10 Individualism items are presented in Table 1. As may be seen, all factor loadings were positive and greater than .20, with 9 of the 10 loadings exceeding .30. Moreover, all $z$ scores (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1989) associated with the factor loadings were significant. Finally, the average reliability coefficient across the five samples (.76) was acceptable, albeit somewhat low. Thus, the internal validity and internal consistency of the Individualism scale were judged to be acceptable.

Collectivism. Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the 10 items on the Collectivism scale for Samples 1-4 and 6 are available upon request from the authors. The correlation matrices were entered into a five-group confirmatory factor analysis using LISREL. The hypothesized patterns of latent-observed paths (along with equality constraints regarding factor loadings, measurement error, and correlation matrices) for the initial model were the same as those for the Individualism items.

The resulting chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio associated with the initial model (1.66) was acceptable. However, the absolute chi-square value (422.62) was significantly greater than zero ($df = 255$, $p < .01$). Modification indices indicated that in order to obtain a model whose chi-square value was nonsignificant, it was necessary to allow correlated measurement errors to vary from sample to sample for the following pairs of items: Items 9 and 5, Items 10 and 4, Items 8 and 5, Items 4 and 2, Items 4 and 3, Items 8 and 3, Items 8 and 7, Items 9 and 8, and Items 10 and 1. The revised model yielded an acceptable chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio (1.01) and an absolute chi-square value (212.83) that was nonsignificant ($df = 210$, ns). Furthermore, the revised model provided a significantly better fit to the data than did the initial model (the difference in chi-squares = 209.79, the difference in degrees of freedom = 45, $p < .01$). Thus, we concluded that despite the variance in correlated measurement error across samples for several pairs of items, the latent-observed paths and uncorrelated measurement errors did not vary significantly across samples.

Factor loadings (i.e., latent-observed paths) associated with the 10 Collectivism items are presented in Table 1. As may be seen, all factor loadings were positive and greater than .20, with 9 of the 10 loadings exceeding .30. Moreover, all $z$ scores associated with the factor loadings were significant. Finally, the average reliability coefficient across the five samples (.76) was acceptably high. Thus, the internal validity and internal consistency of the Collectivism scale were judged to be acceptable.

Collectivism. Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the 10 items on the Collectivism scale for Samples 2, 3, 5, and 6 are available upon request from the authors. The correlation matrices were entered into a four-group confirmatory factor analysis using LISREL. The hypothesized patterns of latent-observed paths in the initial model (along with equality constraints regarding factor loadings and measurement error for the Familism items) were the same as those for the Individualism and Collectivism items.

The resulting chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio associated with the initial model (1.74) was acceptable. However, the absolute chi-square value (348.19) was significantly greater than zero ($df = 200$, $p < .01$). Modification indices indicated that in order to obtain a model whose chi-square value was nonsignificant, it was necessary to allow correlated measurement errors to vary from sample to sample for the following pairs of items: Items 4 and 2, Items 9 and 2, Items 6 and 5, Items 6 and 3, Items 7 and 1, Items 10 and 6, Items 9 and 7, Items 8 and 2, and Items 8 and 4. The revised model yielded an acceptable chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio (1.12) and an absolute chi-square value (184.05) that was nonsignificant ($df = 164$, ns). Furthermore, the revised model provided a significantly better fit to the data than did the initial model (the difference in chi-squares = 164.14, the difference in degrees of freedom = 36, $p < .01$). Thus, we concluded that despite the variance in correlated measurement error across samples for several pairs of items, the latent-observed paths and uncorrelated measurement errors did not vary significantly across samples.

Factor loadings (i.e., latent-observed paths) associated with the 10 Familism items are presented in Table 1. As may be seen, all factor loadings were positive and greater than .40. Moreover, all $z$ scores associated with the factor loadings were significant. Finally, the average reliability coefficient across the four samples (.88) was acceptably high. Thus, the internal validity and internal consistency of the Familism scale were judged to be acceptable.

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4 As Bollen (1989) noted, conventional reliability coefficients such as Cronbach's $a$ fail to account for correlated measurement error and therefore often underestimate the internal consistency of social psychological measures. Given that the average $a$ across the five samples was respectable in spite of this shortcoming, we viewed the alpha coefficient as acceptable.

5 Because collectivism was not a primary focus of Michael Lyde's (1994) study, the Collectivism scale was not administered to Samples 5.

6 Because familialism was not a primary focus of Michael C. Henderson's (1996) and Diana Hicks's (1994) studies, the Familism scale was not administered to Samples 1 and 4.
Table 1  
Factor Loadings for Cultural Value Orientation Items in Study 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor loading</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individualism</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. I'm not to blame for others' misfortunes.</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I feel that I'm the master of my own fate.</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I really feel that the &quot;pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps&quot; philosophy makes a lot of sense.</td>
<td>.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. These days, the only person you can depend upon is yourself.</td>
<td>.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. I take great pride in accomplishing what no one else can accomplish.</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I actively resist other people's efforts to mold me.</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Before I can feel comfortable with anybody else, I must feel comfortable with myself.</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. I place personal freedom above all other values.</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. I know myself better than anyone else possibly could know me.</td>
<td>.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. I see nothing wrong with self-promotion.</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collectivism</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. I don't feel that I'm a success unless I've helped others succeed as well.</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I want the opportunity to give back to my community.</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I'm the type of person who lends a helping hand wherever possible.</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I consider myself a team player.</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. My major mission in life is striving for social justice for all.</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. My heart reaches out to those who are less fortunate than myself.</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. If another person can learn from my mistakes, I'm willing to share my ups and downs with that person so that he or she can do better.</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. It feels great to know that others can count on me.</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. I have an important role to play in bringing together the peoples of the world.</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I believe in the motto, &quot;United We Stand, Divided We Fall.&quot;</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Familism</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. When it comes to social responsibility, blood really is thicker than water.</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. My family always is there for me in times of need.</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I owe it to my parents to do well in life.</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I know that my family has my best interests in mind.</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I cherish the time that I spend with my relatives.</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I will do all that I can to keep alive the traditions passed on to me by my parents and grandparents.</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Even when I'm far away from home, my family ties keep me feeling safe and secure.</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. To this day, my parents' teachings serve as my best guide to behavior.</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. In my opinion, the family is the most important social institution of all.</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I cannot imagine what I would do without my family.</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Individualism scale was not administered to participants in Sample 5. Items were responded to on a 5-point, Likert-type scale by Samples 1-3 and on a 4-point scale by Sample 4. For all samples, higher scores reflect higher levels of psychological individualism.  
* The Collectivism scale was not administered to participants in Sample 5. Items were responded to on a 5-point, Likert-type scale by Samples 1-3 and on a 4-point scale by Sample 4. For all samples, higher scores reflect higher levels of psychological collectivism.  
* The Familism scale was not administered to participants in Sample 4. Items were responded to on a 5-point, Likert-type scale by Samples 1-3 and on a 6-point scale for Sample 5. For all samples, higher scores reflect higher levels of psychological familism.

**Ethnic Group Membership as a Predictor of Levels of Individualism, Collectivism, and Familism**

We conducted a series of planned comparisons (Toothaker, 1993) to test the hypotheses that Anglos would score significantly higher in individualism and significantly lower in collectivism and familism than would persons of color. Because Samples 2 and 6 were the only samples in which Anglos, African Americans, Latinas/Latinos, and Asian Americans all were represented, we confined our planned comparisons to those two samples. In addition to carrying out the analyses separately for Samples 2 and 6, we conducted meta-analyses (Wolf, 1986) in an attempt to find out which group differences generalized across the two samples. Means and standard deviations for the three cultural value orientations among Anglos, African Americans, Latinas/Latinos, and Asian Americans are presented in Table 2. For the two samples as a whole, correlations between individualism and collectivism (−.06 for Sample 2 and −.09 for Sample 6) and between individualism and familism (−.08 for Sample 2 and −.09 for Sample 6) were all significantly negative.
for Sample 6), between collectivism and familism (.48 for Sample 2 and .10 for Sample 6), and between individualism and familism (.14 for both samples) indicated that the three cultural value orientations were empirically and conceptually distinct.

Planned comparisons between Anglos and ethnic minorities in general indicated that in Sample 2, Anglos scored higher in individualism than did persons of color as a whole, with the difference approaching significance, \( t(58) = -1.78, p < .09 \); in Sample 6, Anglos scored slightly lower in individualism than did persons of color, although the difference was non-significant, \( t(46) = .88, ns. \) In addition, in Sample 2, Anglos scored significantly lower in collectivism than did persons of color as a whole, \( t(58) = 3.66, p < .01 \); in Sample 6, Anglos likewise scored significantly lower than did persons of color; \( t(33.3) = 2.20, p < .05. \) Finally, in Sample 2, Anglos scored lower in femininity than did persons of color, with the difference approaching significance, \( t(60) = 1.78, p < .09 \); in Sample 6, Anglos likewise scored lower in femininity than did persons of color, with the difference approaching significance, \( t(46) = 1.82, p < .08. \) Table 3 presents meta-analytic summary of the planned-comparison results across Studies 2 and 6.

Racial/Ethnic Identity as a Mediator of Links Between Race/Ethnicity and Cultural Value Orientations

Means and standard deviations for racial/ethnic identity scores among Anglos, African Americans, Latinas/Latinos, and Asian Americans for Sample 2 are presented in Table 4. Planned comparisons indicated that, as expected, persons of color tended to score significantly higher on racial/ethnic identity than did Anglos, \( t(64) = -3.89, p < .01. \) In turn, racial/ethnic identity was positively and significantly correlated with collectivism \( (r = .46, p < .01) \) and familism \( (r = .54, p < .01); \) it also was positively correlated with individualism, although this correlation did not approach significance \( (r = .13, ns). \)

Finally, to determine whether the links between race/ethnicity and cultural value orientations remained intact even after controlling for racial/ethnic identity (which, as indicated above, can be viewed as both a consequence of race/ethnicity and an antecedent of cultural value orientations), we conducted analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) of the Sample 2 data using race/ethnicity as the factor, racial/ethnic identity as the covariate, and individualism, collectivism, and familism as the variates (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Results of the ANCOVAs revealed that after controlling for the influence of racial/ethnic identity—which emerged as a significant positive predictor of all three cultural value orientations—the influence of race/ethnicity on all three cultural value orientations became nonsignificant. A summary of the ANCOVA results is presented in Table 5.

Overall, the results of Study 1 suggest that individualism, collectivism, and familism represented three distinct cultural value orientations. Moreover, the findings from Samples 2 and 6 suggest that the degree to which individuals espoused collectivist and familialistic (but not individualistic) beliefs varied as a function of individuals' race/ethnicity, with persons of color tending to score significantly higher on collectivism and familism than did Anglos. However, Anglos did not score appreciably higher on individualism than did persons of color. These results are identical to those reported by Freeberg and Stein (1996) regarding comparisons between Anglos' and Latinas'/Latinos' levels of individualism, collectivism, and familism. Finally, in Sample 2, ANCOVAs revealed that the influence of race/ethnicity on all three cultural value orientations was mediated by individuals' racial/ethnic identity.

Nevertheless, certain aspects of Study 1 remained problematic. First, only two of the six samples allowed us to test for racial/ethnic group differences on all three cultural value dimensions. Thus, it was still unclear whether the results would generalize to one or more new samples. Moreover, the sample sizes in Study 1 were not large enough for us to conduct separate confirmatory factor analyses for men and women. For these reasons, in Study 2, we not only attempted to replicate the

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Sample 2</th>
<th>Sample 6</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( p )</td>
<td>( z )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.383</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivism</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivism</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Anglos, \( t(64) = -3.89, p < .01. \) In turn, racial/ethnic identity was positively and significantly correlated with collectivism \( (r = .46, p < .01) \) and familism \( (r = .54, p < .01); \) it also was positively correlated with individualism, although this correlation did not approach significance \( (r = .13, ns). \)

Finally, to determine whether the links between race/ethnicity and cultural value orientations remained intact even after controlling for racial/ethnic identity (which, as indicated above, can be viewed as both a consequence of race/ethnicity and an antecedent of cultural value orientations), we conducted analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) of the Sample 2 data using race/ethnicity as the factor, racial/ethnic identity as the covariate, and individualism, collectivism, and familism as the variates (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Results of the ANCOVAs revealed that after controlling for the influence of racial/ethnic identity—which emerged as a significant positive predictor of all three cultural value orientations—the influence of race/ethnicity on all three cultural value orientations became nonsignificant. A summary of the ANCOVA results is presented in Table 5.

Overall, the results of Study 1 suggest that individualism, collectivism, and familism represented three distinct cultural value orientations. Moreover, the findings from Samples 2 and 6 suggest that the degree to which individuals espoused collectivist and familialistic (but not individualistic) beliefs varied as a function of individuals' race/ethnicity, with persons of color tending to score significantly higher on collectivism and familism than did Anglos. However, Anglos did not score appreciably higher on individualism than did persons of color. These results are identical to those reported by Freeberg and Stein (1996) regarding comparisons between Anglos' and Latinas'/Latinos' levels of individualism, collectivism, and familism. Finally, in Sample 2, ANCOVAs revealed that the influence of race/ethnicity on all three cultural value orientations was mediated by individuals' racial/ethnic identity.

Nevertheless, certain aspects of Study 1 remained problematic. First, only two of the six samples allowed us to test for racial/ethnic group differences on all three cultural value dimensions. Thus, it was still unclear whether the results would generalize to one or more new samples. Moreover, the sample sizes in Study 1 were not large enough for us to conduct separate confirmatory factor analyses for men and women. For these reasons, in Study 2, we not only attempted to replicate the

Tests of homogeneity of variance revealed that separate variance estimates would be needed to determine this \( t \) statistic for Sample 6.
Table 4
Sample 2's Mean Scores and Standard Deviations on Racial/Ethnic Identity Measures as a Function of Race/Ethnicity in Study 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/ethnicity</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglos</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Americans</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinas/Latinos</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Americans</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All items were responded to on a 5-point, Likert-type scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5), with higher scores reflecting higher levels of racial/ethnic identity.

findings from Study 1 regarding the multidimensionality of cultural value orientations and the resulting racial/ethnic group differences (or lack thereof), but also sought to determine whether the Study 1 findings would generalize across the genders.

Study 2
Method
Participants
Participants in Sample 1 were 90 pairs of male–female friends and romantic partners recruited from the Claremont Colleges for larger studies on personal relationship processes conducted by Yumi Takahashi (1994) and Nancy Yum (1994). Approximately half were recruited from introductory psychology classes at Pomona College, and approximately half were recruited from students enrolled in a course on personal relationships. The mean age of the male participants was 21.06 years (SD = 4.82 years), and the mean age of the female participants was 10.74 years (SD = 3.92 years). Among the men, 57% were Anglo, 12% were African American, 6% were Latino, 24% were Asian American, and 1% did not indicate their ethnicity. Among the women, 45% were Anglo, 8% were African American, 15% were Latina, 29% were Asian American, and 3% did not indicate their ethnicity. Among the couples, 69% were intraracial/intraethnic pairings.

Sample 2 consisted of 112 pairs of male–female romantic partners who participated in a larger study on relationship processes among interracial/interethnic couples (Gaines et al., 1996). The mean age of the male participants was 34.06 years (SD = 10.74 years), and the mean age of the female participants was 32.69 years (SD = 9.54 years). Among the men, 39% were Anglo, 32% were African American, 15% were Latino, 11% were Asian American, and 3% did not indicate their ethnicity. Among the women, 49% were Anglo, 14% were African American, 11% were Latina, 21% were Asian American, 3% were Native American, and 3% did not indicate their ethnicity.

Instruments and Procedure
The 10-item scales measuring individualism, collectivism, and familism from Study 1 were used in Study 2. In Samples 1 and 2, after reading and signing an informed-consent form, each individual was instructed by the experimenter to answer the questions independently, without conferring with his or her relationship partner. After completing the cultural value orientation scales (along with a variety of other scales not relevant to the present study), participants read a debriefing sheet that explained the purposes of the study in greater detail. They were given the opportunity to complete a feedback sheet and then thanked and dismissed by the experimenter.

Results and Discussion
Psychometric Properties of the Individualism, Collectivism, and Familism Scales Among Men and Women
We conducted multiple-group confirmatory factor analyses separately for each gender to assess the internal and external validities of the Individualism, Collectivism, and Familism scales. As in Study 1, we began by computing matrices of zero-order correlations among the 10 items that formed a given scale in each sample. We entered the correlation matrices for those samples into a structural equation model that specified one common factor sufficient to account for significant interindividual variance in scores on the set of 10 items across the two samples.

Individualism. Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the 10 items on the Individualism scale for Samples 1 and 2 are available upon request from the authors. For men, the resulting chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio associated with the initial model (1.01) was acceptable. In fact, the absolute chi-square value (91.26) was not significantly greater than zero (df = 90, n.s.). Therefore, no modifications were required for the model when it was applied to the correlational data for men.

For women, the resulting chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio associated with the initial model (1.29) likewise was acceptable. Unlike the initial model for men, the absolute chi-square value in the initial model for women (116.39) was significantly greater than zero (df = 90, p < .05). Modification indices indicated that across the two samples of women the correlated measurement error terms between Items 8 and 7 and between Items 7 and item 5 should be freed. After these modifications were made,
the final model for women achieved an acceptable chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio (1.14), a chi-square that could not be rejected (98.51, df = 86, ns), and a significantly better fit to the data (the difference in chi-squares = 17.88, the difference in degrees of freedom = 4, p < .01).

Factor loadings (i.e., latent-observed paths) associated with the 10 Individualism items for men and women separately are presented in Table 6. As may be seen, all factor loadings were positive for both genders. For men, 9 of the 10 loadings exceeded .20, with 6 loadings exceeding .30; for women, all 10 loadings exceeded .20, with 8 loadings exceeding .30. With the exception of Item 6 for men, all z scores associated with the factor loadings were significant for both genders. Finally, the average reliability coefficients for men and women across the two samples (.56 for men and .59 for women) were acceptable, albeit somewhat low. Overall, the internal validity and internal consistency of the Individualism scale were judged to be acceptable.

Collectivism. Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the 10 items on the Collectivism scale for Samples 1 and 2 are available upon request from the authors. For men, the resulting chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio associated with the initial model (1.72) was acceptable. However, the absolute chi-square value (154.38) was significantly greater than zero (df = 90, p < .01). Modification indices indicated that in order to obtain a model whose chi-square value was nonsignificant, it was necessary to allow correlated measurement errors to vary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Loading</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I don't feel that I'm a success unless I've helped others succeed as well.</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I want the opportunity to give back to my community.</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I'm the type of person who lends a helping hand whenever possible.</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I consider myself a team player.</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. My major mission in life is striving for social justice for all.</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. My heart reaches out to those who are less fortunate than myself.</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>7. If another person can learn from my mistakes, I'm willing to share my ups and downs with that person so that he or she can do better.</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. It feels great to know that others can count on me.</td>
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<td>.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. I have an important role to play in bringing together the peoples of the world.</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I believe in the motto, &quot;United We Stand, Divided We Fall.&quot;</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Note. Items on all three measures were responded to on a 5-point, Likert-type scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5), with higher scores reflecting higher levels of the psychological dimension. |
across samples for the following pairs of items: Items 8 and 4, Items 9 and 5, Items 3 and 1, Items 8 and 3, and Items 10 and 7. The revised model yielded an acceptable chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio (1.17) and an absolute chi-square value (93.71) that was nonsignificant ($df = 80, ns$). Furthermore, the revised model provided a significantly better fit to the data than did the initial model (the difference in chi-squares = 60.67, the difference in degrees of freedom = 10, $p < .01$). Thus, we concluded that despite the variance in correlated measurement error across samples for several pairs of items, the latent-observed paths and uncorrelated measurement errors did not vary significantly across samples for men.

For women, the resulting chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio associated with the initial model (1.63) was acceptable. However, the absolute chi-square value (146.60) was significantly greater than zero ($df = 90, p < .01$). Modification indices revealed that for the model to yield an acceptable chi-square value, the correlated measurement error terms between Items 9 and 5, between Items 8 and 1, and between Items 5 and 2 would have to be freed across the two samples of women. After these error terms were freed, the final model yielded an acceptable chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio (1.15), an absolute chi-square value (96.83) that could not be rejected ($df = 84, ns$), and a significantly better fit to the data (the difference in chi-squares = 49.77, the difference in degrees of freedom = 6, $p < .01$).

Factor loadings (i.e., latent-observed paths) associated with the 10 Collectivism items for men and women separately are presented in Table 6. As may be seen, all factor loadings were positive for both genders. For men, all 10 loadings exceeded .20, with 8 loadings exceeding .30; for women, all 10 loadings exceeded .20, with 9 loadings exceeding .30. In addition, all $z$ scores associated with the factor loadings were significant for both genders. Finally, the average reliability coefficients for men and women across the two samples (.74 for men and .73 for women) were acceptable. Overall, the internal validity and internal consistency of the Collectivism scale were judged to be acceptable.

**Familism.** Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the 10 items on the Familism scale for Samples 1 and 2 are available upon request from the authors. For men, the resulting chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio associated with the initial model (1.52) was acceptable. However, the absolute chi-square value (136.54) was significantly greater than zero ($df = 90, p < .01$). Modification indices indicated that in order to obtain a model whose chi-square value was nonsignificant, it was necessary to allow correlated measurement errors to vary from sample to sample for the following pairs of items: Items 10 and 9, Items 7 and 3, Items 9 and 1, Items 8 and 7, and Items 6 and 2. The revised model yielded an acceptable chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio (1.18) and an absolute chi-square value (94.60) that was nonsignificant ($df = 80, ns$). Furthermore, the revised model provided a significantly better fit to the data than did the initial model (the difference in chi-squares = 41.94, the difference in degrees of freedom = 10, $p < .01$). Thus, we concluded that despite the variance in correlated measurement error across samples for several pairs of items, the latent-observed paths and uncorrelated measurement errors did not vary significantly across samples for men.

For women, the resulting chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio associated with the initial model (1.76) was acceptable. However, the absolute chi-square value (158.03) was significantly greater than zero ($df = 90, p < .01$). Modification indices revealed that for the model to yield an acceptable chi-square value, the correlated measurement error terms between Items 7 and 2, between Items 5 and 3, between Items 9 and 4, between Items 3 and 1, and between Items 9 and 2 would have to be freed across the two samples of women. After these error terms were freed, the final model yielded an acceptable chi-square:degrees-of-freedom ratio (1.10), an absolute chi-square value (88.43) that could not be rejected ($df = 80, ns$), and a significantly better fit to the data (the difference in chi-squares = 69.58, the difference in degrees of freedom = 10, $p < .01$).

Factor loadings (i.e., latent-observed paths) associated with the 10 Familism items for men and women separately are presented in Table 6. As may be seen, all factor loadings were positive for both genders. For men, all 10 loadings exceeded .30; for women, all 10 loadings exceeded .20, with 9 loadings exceeding .30. In addition, all $z$ scores associated with the factor loadings were significant for both genders. Finally, the average reliability coefficient across the two samples (.87 for men and .84 for women) was acceptable. Overall, the internal validity and internal consistency of the Familism scale were judged to be acceptable.

**Ethnic Group Membership as a Predictor of Levels of Individualism, Collectivism, and Familism Among Men and Women**

We conducted a series of planned comparisons separately for each gender to test the hypotheses that Anglos would score significantly higher in individualism and significantly lower in collectivism and familism than would persons of color. In addition to carrying out the analyses separately for Samples 1 and 2, we conducted meta-analyses in an attempt to find out which group differences generalized across the two samples. Means and standard deviations for the three cultural value orientations among Anglos, African Americans, Latinas/Latinos, and Asian Americans are presented in Tables 7 and 8.

For men, correlations between individualism and collectivism ($-.16$ for Sample 1 and $.09$ for Sample 2), between collectivism and familism ($.20$ for Sample 1 and $.37$ for Sample 2), and between individualism and familism ($.26$ for Sample 2 and $.24$ for Sample 2) indicated that the three cultural value orientations were empirically and conceptually distinct. Similarly, for women, correlations between individualism and collectivism ($.01$ for Sample 1 and $.09$ for Sample 2), between collectivism and familism ($.19$ for Sample 2 and $.24$ for Sample 2), and between individualism and familism ($.09$ for Sample 2 and $-.03$ for Sample 2) indicated that the three cultural value orientations were empirically and conceptually distinct.

Planned comparisons between Anglo men and men of color indicated that in Sample 1, Anglo men scored lower in individualism than did men of color as a whole, although the difference was nonsignificant, $t(82) = -1.48, ns$; in Sample 2, Anglo men scored slightly higher in individualism than did men of color, although the difference was nonsignificant, $t(103) = 40, ns$. In addition, in Sample 1, Anglo men scored virtually the
same in collectivism than did men of color as a whole, $r(66.88) = .28$, $ns$; in Sample 2, Anglo men scored significantly lower than did men of color, $t(104) = -2.71, p < .01$. Finally, in Sample 1, Anglo men scored significantly lower in familism than did men of color, $t(78) = -2.64, p = .01$; in Sample 2, Anglo men likewise scored significantly lower in familism than did men of color, $t(103) = -2.23, p < .05$. Table 9 presents a meta-analytic summary of the planned-comparison results across Studies 1 and 2 for men.

Planned comparisons between Anglo women and women of color indicated that in Sample 1, Anglo women scored lower in individualism than did women of color as a whole, with the difference approaching significance, $t(45.9) = -1.82, p < .08$; in Sample 2, Anglo women scored slightly higher in individualism than did women of color, although the difference was nonsignificant, $t(101) = .59, ns$. In addition, in Sample 1, Anglo women scored significantly lower in collectivism than did women of color as a whole, $t(55.8) = -2.01, p < .05$; in Sample 2, Anglo women scored slightly higher than did women of color, although the difference was nonsignificant, $t(67.4) = .13, ns$. Finally, in Sample 1, Anglo women scored somewhat lower in familism than did women of color, although the difference was nonsignificant, $t(82) = -1.62, ns$; in Sample 2, Anglo women scored somewhat lower in familism than did women of color, although the difference was not significant, $t(98) = -1.47, ns$. Table 9 presents a meta-analytic summary of the planned-comparison results across Studies 1 and 2 for women.

Taken as a whole, the results of Study 2 replicate those of Study 1 regarding the factor structure of the Individualism, Collectivism, and Familism scales. Also, among men, the results of Study 2 replicate those of Study 1 regarding racial/ethnic group differences on cultural value orientations; that is, men of color tended to score higher on collectivism and familism than did Anglo men, and men of color and Anglo men tended not to differ in their scores on individualism. However, among women in Study 2, none of the cultural value orientations varied as a function of race/ethnicity. Thus, the results of Study 1 regarding racial/ethnic group differences in collectivism and familism were replicated only among the men in Study 2. These results differ from those reported by Freeberg and Stein (1996) regarding Anglos’ and Latinas’/Latinos’ cultural value orientations, in that gender was not a moderator of the impact of race/ethnicity on any of the cultural values in that study.

### Table 7

**Men’s Mean Scores and Standard Deviations on Cultural Value Orientation Measures as a Function of Race/Ethnicity in Study 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial/ethnic group</th>
<th>Sample 1</th>
<th>Sample 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>$M$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglos</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Americans</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Americans</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglos</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Americans</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Americans</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familism</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglos</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Americans</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Americans</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. All item scores for a given scale were summed and divided by the number of items in order to yield a single score for each individual on the scale in question.*

### Table 8

**Women’s Mean Scores and Standard Deviations on Cultural Value Orientation Measures as a Function of Race/Ethnicity in Study 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial/ethnic group</th>
<th>Sample 1</th>
<th>Sample 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>$M$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglos</td>
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</tr>
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<td>African Americans</td>
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<td>3.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asian Americans</td>
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<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
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<td>Collectivism</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Anglos</td>
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<td>African Americans</td>
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<td>3.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinas</td>
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<td>3.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asian Americans</td>
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<td>3.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Familism</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Anglos</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Americans</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinas</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Americans</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. All item scores for a given scale were summed and divided by the number of items in order to yield a single score for each individual on the scale in question.*

Tests of homogeneity of variance revealed that separate variance estimates would be needed to determine this $t$ statistic for Sample 1 men.

Tests of homogeneity of variance revealed that separate variance estimates would be needed to determine this $t$ statistic for Sample 1 women.

Tests of homogeneity of variance revealed that separate variance estimates would be needed to determine this $t$ statistic for Sample 2 women.
three distinct cultural value orientations. As we expected, individualism essentially was orthogonal to both collectivism and familism. However, the positive correlation that we expected between collectivism and familism was not consistently significant across the samples in the two studies.

In Study 1, and among men but not women in Study 2, collectivism and familism were influenced by individuals’ race/ethnicity, but individualism was not. However, ANCOVAs in Study 1 revealed that individuals’ racial/ethnic identity mediated the impact of race/ethnicity on all three cultural value orientations. Specifically, persons of color tended to score higher in racial/ethnic identity than did Anglos, and racial/ethnic identity was positively related to scores on measures of psychological individualism, collectivism, and familism.

**Individualism Reconsidered**

Why were individual differences in psychological individualism so difficult to predict? One possible explanation is that our particular measure of individualism was uniquely flawed. After all, even if we take correlated measurement error into account, the internal consistency of the Individualism scale was lower than that of the Collectivism and Familism scales across samples and across studies. However, a comparison of the reliability coefficients obtained in the present studies with those obtained in previous studies of cultural value orientations contradicts such an explanation. For example, Freeberg and Stein (1996) reported individualism alpha coefficients of .62 in previous studies and .47 in their own study, collectivism alpha coefficients of .65 in previous studies and .59 in their own study, and familism alpha coefficients of .64 to .76 in previous studies and .69 in their own study. In each instance, our measures of cultural value orientations, which have not been published previously, yielded reliability coefficients that were at least as high as those reported by Freeberg and Stein, despite the fact that Freeberg and Stein used scales that had been developed by previous authors. Therefore, the lack of explained individual differences in psychological individualism did not appear to be an artifact of the particular measure that we used.

A more likely explanation regarding our failure to predict levels of individualism is that individualism is inherently difficult to measure. The fact that the internal consistencies of individualism scales have been rather low in several previous studies (e.g., Cross, 1995; Freeberg & Stein, 1996; Kagan & Zahn, 1983; Oyserman et al., 1995) suggests that the construct itself is in need of refinement. Even among studies in which relatively high individualism alphas have been reported (e.g., Gudykunst et al., 1996; M.-S. Kim et al., 1996; Singelis & Sharkey, 1995; Singelis et al., 1995), measurement problems have surfaced. For instance, in terms of relative fit, a four-factor model reported by Singelis et al. (1995) that specifies horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism and collectivism fit the correlational data significantly better than did either a one-factor or a two-factor model; yet in terms of absolute fit, the chi-square associated with the four-factor model was sufficiently high that we had to reject the model.

Finally, it is possible that individualism, as a value orientation prized by the dominant (i.e., European American) culture, has been imposed on all cultures within American society (Asante, 1994; A. Ramirez, 1987; Rosenberger, 1992; Semmes, 1992). Thus, the process by which persons of color as well as Anglos internalize individualism might be relatively passive. Alternatively, it is possible that many, if not most, persons of color in the United States have become acculturated to the norms embraced by European American culture (Berry et al., 1992). This latter process suggests that persons of color in particular might play an active role in internalizing European American cultural values. Either process would lead one to speculate that individualism is uniformly high across a variety of racial/ethnic groups in the United States.

Some authors (e.g., Gelfand et al., 1996; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1992) have concluded that it is time for social scientists to reconceptualize psychological individualism. With regard to intergroup relations, the comment of Hurwitz and Peffley (1992) is particularly instructive: “Individualism, no matter how it is measured, does not appear to influence either racial stereotyping or racial policy attitudes in any simple, straightforward way” (p. 415). With regard to interpersonal relations, the prognosis may be more optimistic; for example, individualism is a positive predictor of outcome-oriented conversational constraints within cultures and of low-context communication across cultures; Gudykunst et al., 1996; M.-S. Kim et al., 1996). Nevertheless, within the realm of culture and personality, the lack of significant links between individualism and race/ethnicity in several previous studies (e.g., Cross, 1995; Freeberg & Stein, 1996; Gudykunst et al., 1996; Kagan & Zahn, 1983; but see M.-S. Kim et al., 1996; Singelis & Sharkey, 1995) calls attention to the need for researchers—ourselves included—to clarify what it is that they mean when they speak of individualism.

**Strengths and Limitations of the Present Research**

The present studies represent an advance in the study of cultural value orientations in several respects. First, they suggest that when individuals are not constrained to score as either self-oriented or group oriented, resulting scores on individualism and collectivism are uncorrelated (rather than negatively correlated, as is typically assumed; Gaines, 1995). Second, when
individuals are not constrained to score as both community oriented and family oriented, resulting scores on collectivism and familism are only modestly (albeit positively) correlated. Third, when cultural value orientations are examined among persons of color as well as among Anglos, resulting scores on collectivism and familism (but not individualism) for Anglos are significantly lower than those for persons of color and thus are not generalizable to persons of color. Fourth, when racial/ethnic identity is included as a covariate of individualism, collectivism, and familism, not only is its influence positive and significant, but race/ethnicity—which does predict racial/ethnic identity (i.e., persons of color tend to score higher than do Anglos)—loses significance as a predictor of all three cultural value orientations. Finally, when links between ethnicity and the we orientations of collectivism and familism are examined separately for men and for women, ethnicity proves to be a significant predictor only among men.

Certain shortcomings characterize the present studies as well. For example, even though we collected sufficient data from African Americans, Latinas/Latinos, and Asian Americans to permit meaningful comparisons between Anglos and persons of color in general, we did not have a sufficiently large number of individuals among any of the three largest racial/ethnic minority groups to permit such comparisons among different minority groups (see also Gudykunst et al., 1996; Singelis & Sharkey, 1995). In addition, the lack of large numbers of members of each of the three largest racial/ethnic minority groups made it impractical to carry out separate confirmatory factor analyses for each group and thus determine whether the resulting factor structures generalized across racial/ethnic groups (Oyserman et al., 1995; but see Yamaguchi et al., 1995). Nevertheless, the congruence between Freeberg and Stein’s (1996) results and those of Study 1 indicates that racial/ethnic group differences in collectivism and familism, as well as racial/ethnic group similarities in individualism, may depend primarily on minority/majority status (and, presumably, the prejudice and discrimination with which persons of color as a whole must contend) in the United States (Helms, in press; Phinney, 1996).

Directions for Future Research

Future research on cultural value orientations might benefit from further differentiation among racial/ethnic groups. For example, given that the literature on African American psychology tends to emphasize collectivism as a predominant cultural theme, it would be useful to determine whether African Americans tend to score higher on collectivism than do Latinas/Latinos or Asian Americans. Conversely, given that the literature on Latina/Latino psychology and Asian American psychology tends to emphasize familism as a predominant cultural theme, it would be useful to determine whether Latinas/Latinos and Asian Americans tend to score higher on familism than do African Americans. In addition, in each of the major racial/ethnic groups in the United States, a host of variables (e.g., socioeconomic status, religious denomination, and immigrant status) might influence individuals’ tendency to embrace one or more cultural value orientations (Triandis, 1995).

Future research on cultural value orientations and race/ethnicity also might profit from further differentiation among the we orientations. The present studies demonstrate the utility of conceptualizing individuals’ immediate and extended family as an in-group distinct from their larger community as an in-group. However, it is also possible to view a person’s romantic relationship as an in-group distinct from his or her larger family; researchers might label individuals’ orientation toward the welfare of their romantic relationships romanticism (Gaines & Liu, in press; see also Doherty, Hatfield, Thompson, & Choo, 1994; Gaines et al., 1995; Sprecher et al., 1994). In addition, it is possible to view all living entities—animals as well as humans, the natural as well as the supernatural—as an in-group; researchers might label individuals’ orientations toward the welfare of all living entities spiritualism (Triandis, 1995; see also Dhawan et al., 1995; Jagers & Mock, 1993; Landrine & Klonoff, 1994). By conceptualizing and operationalizing cultural value orientations in an increasingly sophisticated manner, researchers might uncover a variety of antecedents and consequences of cultural value orientations that previously had not been considered.

Conclusions

In closing, we return to the theme of evolving personality—social psychology perspectives on personal and social identities with which we began this article. All too often, claims regarding the “universality” of intrapersonal and interpersonal phenomena are made on the basis of data obtained from—and by—persons from one ethnic group (i.e., Anglos) in one nation (i.e., the United States). Fortunately, mainstream personality—social psychologists (e.g., Crocker et al., 1994; Kowalski & Wolfe, 1994; Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Miller & Prentice, 1994; Singelis, 1994; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) have begun to heed cultural psychologists’ call for cross-national research to determine which, if any, supposedly universal phenomena are characteristic of persons beyond the shores of the United States (Wiggins & Pincus, 1992). Unfortunately, they have yet to respond en masse to African American, Latina/Latino, and Asian American psychologists’ call for cross-ethnic research in the United States to determine which, if any, “universals” are characteristic of persons of color (Ibrahim & Kahn, 1987; see also Kluckhohn & Strodtebeck, 1961; van Dijk, 1993). We hope that the results of the present studies will help alert mainstream personality—social psychologists of the need to examine personal and social identities across a diverse array of ethnicities within as well as outside of the United States. As has been pointed out elsewhere (e.g., Gaines, 1995; Gaines & Reed, 1994, 1995; Moghaddam, 1987; Phinney, 1996), if personality—social psychology is to transcend ethnicity, it must first address ethnicity.

References


Belgrave, F. Z., Cherry, V. R., Cunningham, D., Walwyn, S., Lettaka-


